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Shelby and the Sisyphean Struggle for Black Enfranchisement 
 
By Rick Valelly 
 
     In the blockbuster of 2013, Shelby v. Holder, the Supreme Court’s conservative 
majority washed its hands of a half century of voting rights jurisprudence. 
Previously, the Court often revised parts of the statute, but always with the 
premise that the statute’s building blocks are constitutional.  Actions by the 
Court in turn would set the agenda of Congress.  Congress would respond to 
judicial decisions when it brought the Act up for renewal (in 1970, 1975, 1982, 
and 2006.)  On those occasions, Congress strengthened or ratified those judicial 
alterations that improved the Act, and Congress overrode judicial adjustments 
that Congress saw as weakening the Act.   Either way, Congress and the Court 
collaboratively perpetuated the Act with a minimum of inter-branch conflict.  
Neither side fundamentally re-thought or rejected the statute.  The Court 
accorded deference to Congress because the Constitution plainly states that 
Congress enforces the 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution, which are 
the foundation of national voting rights law.  But that consensus and 
collaboration are now gone.   
      The Court’s conservative majority has thus changed the agendas and political 
tasks of other players with a stake in voting rights.  They include liberal voting 
rights lawyers affiliated with such organizations as the NAACP-Legal Defense 
Fund and the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights.  But the most consequential 
player is the Democratic party – the party that largely developed the Voting 
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Rights Act.  It now faces the problem of how best to make good on its 2012 party 
platform stance:  “We believe the right to vote and to have your vote counted is 
an essential American freedom…Democrats have a proud history of standing up 
for the right to vote.”1  The problem is that a major (and unacknowledged) 
partner in establishing and perpetuating the Voting Rights Act – the Republican 
party -- is no longer available.   
     Republicans hardly oppose minority voting rights in principle.  But they are 
now committed to screening the eligible electorate through tests and devices that 
supposedly prevent in-person voter fraud in registration and voting.   These go 
under the catchall term of “voter ID” legislation.  Republicans appear to believe 
that registration and voting are vulnerable to fraudulent management of voter 
registration drives by groups that affiliate with Democrats, such as the now 
defunct advocacy group ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for 
Reform Now.)    
     During its first term, the Obama Administration correctly insisted on federal 
scrutiny of voter ID in states that are covered by the Voting Rights Act, such as 
South Carolina and Texas.  Under the language of the statute, “tests and devices” 
that affect registration and voting cannot go into effect if there is credible 
evidence that they may impair the right to vote.  But that enforcement effort by 
the Obama Administration had a political cost.  It stripped the VRA of bipartisan 
support.  Suddenly brought to bear against voter ID, the VRA metamorphosed – 
or so it seemed to Republicans -- into a partisan instrument. 
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     Republicans consequently have little appetite for joining with Democrats to 
find some way to overrule the Supreme Court’s Shelby decision.  In 2006, both 
political parties joined forces to renew the VRA.  Republicans and Democrats 
agreed so much, in fact, that they overruled two previous Court decisions that 
had narrowed how the VRA regulated the drawing of voter districts.   
     Now most congressional Republicans – and certainly all Southern Republicans 
-- are too invested in their party’s vigorous effort to reduce the risk of voter fraud 
in American elections. Although in-person voter fraud hardly exists in the 
United States, Republicans insist that the electoral process must not have any 
hint of such fraud.  Often pointing to opinion surveys that back them, they hold 
that the public wants voter ID because citizens want to be absolutely certain of 
the integrity of the electoral process. 
     As the 2012 Republican platform stated, “Honest elections are the foundation 
of representative government… we applaud legislation to require photo 
identification for voting and to prevent election fraud, particularly with regard to 
registration and absentee ballots. We support State laws that require proof of 
citizenship at the time of voter registration to protect our electoral system against 
a significant and growing form of voter fraud.  Every time that a fraudulent vote 
is cast, it effectively cancels out a vote of a legitimate voter.  Voter fraud is 
political poison. It strikes at the heart of representative government.  We call on 
every citizen, elected official, and member of the judiciary to preserve the 
integrity of the vote.  We call for vigorous prosecution of voter fraud at the State 
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and federal level.  To do less disenfranchises present and future generations.”2 
     Democrats, for their part, regard voter ID as transparently intended to help 
Republicans win elections by selectively disenfranchising voters that are likely to 
vote Democratic.  Many voters currently lack the resources to meet the new 
requirements and procedures that are being rolled out in voter ID states, and in 
the more restrictive states – such as North Carolina and Texas – certain groups of 
voters, such as college students and African-Americans -- will find it impossible 
to register and to vote as they done previously.  They may well be able to adjust 
their plans or to acquire the documentation that they need.  But in the meantime 
they are being asked to bear the costs of making the electoral process as “pure” 
as possible – and that strikes Democrats as outrageous.3  Thus the voting rights 
section of the 2012 presidential platform further stated, “During the Obama 
administration, the Justice Department has initiated careful, thorough, and 
independent reviews of proposed voting changes, and it has prevented states 
from implementing voter identification laws that would be harmful to minority 
voters. Democrats know that voter identification laws can disproportionately 
burden young voters, people of color, low-income families, people with 
disabilities, and the elderly, and we refuse to allow the use of political pretexts to 
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How The Stalemate Highlights American Exceptionalism 
     In short, Shelby and its aftermath compose a complex standoff.  The Supreme 
Court elevated the constitutional priority of protecting federalism -- and it 
simultaneously demoted both the priority of voting rights protection and the 
scope of congressional power to implement the 14th and 15th Amendments.  The 
Court effectively rebuked Congress for not knowing how to do its job under the 
enforcement provisions of the 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution.  
The Court could not have broken off its long-standing partnership with Congress 
to make the Voting Rights Act work in a more spectacular way.   
     But new disagreements between the political parties about election 
administration and voter qualifications clearly signify that bipartisan cooperation 
to override the Court – which had always been available earlier and as recently 
as 2006 – is not in the cards.  Voter ID and the VRA have become intertwined.  
Meanwhile, a host of state legislative changes have generated considerable 
uncertainty about whether voters in previously covered states will have their 
access to the ballot impaired in 2014 and 2016.    
     In comparative perspective, this is all quite astonishing.  The United States 
pioneered mass suffrage in the 1820s, foreshadowing similar change in other 
regimes in both the Old World and the New.  The prospect of peering into the 
future brought Tocqueville to America, and led to one of his masterpieces, 
Democracy in America.   
     But the United States also pioneered voting rights politics – that is, a politics of 
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picking winners and losers in who has access to the ballot box. The 1820s saw the 
simultaneous disfranchisement of both women and free African-Americans even 
as state legislatures engineered the enfranchisement of property less adult white 
males.  Nearly two centuries later Americans are still divided by voting rights 
politics.   
     Indeed, the U.S. might be considered an unusual case:  in cross-national 
perspective it is both an early and a late developer in universal voting rights.  The 
road that led to Shelby – and the consequences that the decision has already had – 
underscore this central truth about American voting rights politics.  The United 
States is still struggling with universal suffrage.  
     “Voting wars” – to use Rick Hasen’s superb term – are not unique to the 
United States.4  But our current “voting war” is remarkably robust.  And the risk 
that it poses to African-Americans’ and other minorities’ voting rights, while 
hardly as great as in the past, is nonetheless non-trivial.  Given the length of the 
struggle for black enfranchisement, and the fact that the struggle has left its 
imprint on the Constitution in three places – the 14th, 15th, and the 24th 
Amendments – this continued uncertainty in the security of the black vote is self-
evidently remarkable. 
     In the rest of this essay, I sketch the evolution of the Voting Rights Act with 
particular attention to how it became vulnerable to a decision like Shelby.  Then I 
describe the majority opinion in the case, drawing out its very strong emphases 
on the requirements of federalism and its depiction of the 2006 renewal as 
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irrational.  The Court’s minority opinion, which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
wrote, warned that the majority was making a mistake in picturing Congress as 
botching voting rights enforcement.  Congress knew what it was doing, and the 
Court did not.  For supporters of the voting rights struggle, Ginsburg’s 
suggestion appears to have been vindicated by ensuing events in previously 
covered states.  Controversial and widely publicized voter ID responses to the 
decision have emerged in North Carolina and Texas.  
     I conclude with reflections on how Shelby illuminates the development of 
American democracy.  Whether we need to seriously doubt American 
democracy’s development clearly seems alarmist.  But American political history 
certainly suggests that some concern about what may happen next to the 
democratic gains brought about by the Voting Rights Act is not misplaced.  
Given everything that has happened with the struggle for black enfranchisement 
that fact is, not to put too fine a point on it, simply astounding. 
 
 
The Design and Evolution of the Voting Rights Act 
     When Congress enacted the VRA in 1965 it implemented two parts of the 
Constitution.  It enforced the 15th Amendment:  “The right of citizens of the 
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by 
any State on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude.  The 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”  
The VRA also enforced the first section of the 14th Amendment, which forbids 
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states from denying citizens “the equal protection of the laws.” This prohibition 
has come to mean that legislation infected with animus against a minority is 
impermissible.  Evidence of such animus can consist of either invidious 
statements of purpose by legislators, or by administrators who apply a law, or a 
clear showing that the law or rule systematically disadvantage minorities.  With 
respect to election law, the bottom line is that state and local governments cannot 
impair, much less block, the right to vote of minorities.   
     But here is where policy design was crucial.  Constitutional principles are one 
thing, giving them teeth is another.  In 1965 Congress wanted to devise a statute 
that would work immediately in stopping Southern state and local governments 
from discriminating against black voters – and that would also keep working 
regardless of how these governments tried to get around the Act.  The 1957 and 
1960 Civil Rights Acts, which were voting rights statutes, had turned out to be 
easy for Southern state and local governments to get around because the 
enforcement of those statutes fell to government lawyers.  They went to the 
federal courts to block discriminatory behavior by local elections officials.  
Government lawyers tried to prove that local registrars in a Deep South state 
deliberately discriminated against black voters. They might succeed in 
persuading a judge – they might.  But most of the judges had been selected by 
southern Democratic U.S. senators, thanks to senatorial courtesy in federal 
judicial appointments, and thus were generally hostile to the government 
lawyers.  And even if the lawyers from Washington won in a local federal district 
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court or on appeal to the circuit court for the South, the Fifth Circuit, local 
registrars would then simply do something new.  To give a hypothetical 
scenario, a county registrar might add hours of operation, in response to a 
judicial order.  But simultaneously he might also require all voters on the county 
rolls to prove that they actually lived where they said they lived, and in the 
meantime he would purge the voting rolls and require re-registration, allowing 
him to challenge black voters as they tried to re-register.   
     So Congress needed to figure out some system for stopping such constant 
moving of the goal posts.  What it decided to do was to create an administrative 
system run out of the Department of Justice (DOJ) -- and to require jurisdictions 
that had a history of discriminating against minorities to send any proposed 
changes to Washington or the federal district court for the District of Columbia – 
either one would do – for what came to be called pre-clearance.  This is the scheme 
established by Section 5 of the VRA.  It is known as “Section 5 pre-clearance.” 
     Under pre-clearance, proposed changes to the rules would be sent to 
Washington, and the Department of the Justice or the Washington court would 
have a certain amount of time to review the change sent to it.  If there was 
something objectionable about the change then DOJ or the court would ask for 
more information about it.  If it was quite clear that a discriminatory scheme was 
afoot then DOJ or the court would block the change and put the burden on the 
jurisdiction of explaining to a 3-judge federal court what its intentions were, with 
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the Justice Department having the option, if it lost at that level, of immediate 
review by the Supreme Court. 
     Meanwhile, the United States directly registered thousands of black voters in 
1965 and 1966 and it sent elections observers to watch elections.  Right away 
there was considerable change on the ground -- and the surge in black voter 
registration was permanent because states and local governments no longer 
could turn to clever new rules that would roll back the registration gains. 
     This system of supervising most of the South was initially meant to be 
temporary – the plan would work, it was thought, in five years.  But it was 
renewed in 1970 and again in 1975 – and then again in 1982.  During such 
renewals two new things happened.  One was that Native-American and Latino 
voters were brought into the preclearance system, so parts of South Dakota and 
all of Texas, for example, got added to the list of covered jurisdictions, as did 
New York City.   
     Also in 1982 Congress said that voters in the jurisdictions that were covered 
by the Act were entitled to have elected officials that they preferred.  It did so by 
amending and expanding Section 2:  “A violation…is established if, based on the 
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to 
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open 
to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by…this section in 
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to 
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. 
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[emphasis added]  The extent to which members of a protected class have been 
elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which 
may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to 
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion 
in the population.”5  This change was meant to curb what was called “vote 
dilution.”  A local jurisdiction in the South might be majority white but also have 
a very large black minority population -- and thus very likely have a long history 
of racial tension.  If all of the seats for its representative bodies were elected “at 
large” and if whites voted in a bloc, then the school board, county commission, 
or city council would always be dominated by whites.  But the Act now said that 
minority voters were entitled to remedies for such vote dilution.   
     Section 2, which is permanent, interacted with Section 5 preclearance.  Via the 
pre-clearance process, many covered jurisdictions changed over to elections by 
wards or precincts.   Additionally, state legislative and congressional districts 
had to be drawn by state legislatures in ways that gave minority voters genuine 
influence in state-legislative and U.S. House elections.  Vote dilution in these 
elections had often been accomplished by such devices as “cracking” and 
“packing:” that is, creating districts that allocated small fractions of black voters 
among many districts (cracking) or stuffing black voters into districts (packing), 
thereby ensuring at most token representation in the state legislature or the U.S. 
House.  These practices disappeared, and instead state legislatures, civil rights 
interest groups, election lawyers and the Department of Justice collectively 
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negotiated plans that were fairer.  There were inevitable disagreements about 
what fairness actually required – and even whether this was a kind of affirmative 
action program for state legislatures and the U.S. House.6  But the overall 
intention of amending Section 2, which was to disrupt a white racial monopoly 
on office holding, was fulfilled. 
 
The 2006 Renewal of the Voting Rights Act 
      In short, the VRA’s evolution is a clear success story.  Black voting increased 
and so did black office holding.  In fact, black office holding became normal by 
the 1990s.  Its normalization was a pre-condition for the successful presidential 
candidacy of Barack Obama.   
     Yet such success by itself inevitably raised the possibility that the Act was 
obsolete.  A more subtle way in which the Act’s evolution generated the 
appearance of obsolescence lay in the renewals.  Let me now return to the 
renewals -- 1970, 1975, 1982, and most recently 2006 – a cycle which the reader 
has surely remarked.   
     Why the renewals?  Recall that in principle the Act is temporary.  The default 
setting behind the Act’s special provisions is state control over electoral 
qualifications. But that can only happen if Congress concludes that there is no 
need for federal supervision.  In 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006, Congress focused on 
whether there was strong evidence of continuing problems for minority voters in 
the covered jurisdictions.  In all cases it found enough evidence of resistance to 
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minority voting rights to generate bipartisan coalitions in favor of renewal.  In 
each case, a Republican president agreed with the congressional determination. 
     In 2006, when Congress renewed the Act again for another 25 years, it did so 
by large majorities.  The vote on final passage in the U.S. House was 390-33, and 
the Senate passed it without any dissent, 98-0. When he signed the 2006 renewal, 
President George W. Bush stated, “In four decades since the Voting Rights Act 
was first passed, we've made progress toward equality, yet the work for a more 
perfect union is never ending. We'll continue to build on the legal equality won 
by the civil rights movement… Today, we renew a bill that helped bring a 
community on the margins into the life of American democracy. My 
administration will vigorously enforce the provisions of this law, and we will 
defend it in court. This legislation is named in honor of three heroes of American 
history who devoted their lives to the struggle of civil rights: Fannie Lou Hamer, 
Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King. And in honor of their memory and their 
contributions to the cause of freedom, I am proud to sign the Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006.”7 
     Yet there was also great skepticism in the air about whether the 2006 renewal 
was symbolic, that is, a case of both parties wanting to conspicuously show that 
they stood for minority voting rights.  Abigail Thernstrom, who is today vice-
chair of the United States Civil Rights Commission, had long taken the view that 
the Act over-regulated the electoral process.  In an article published by the 
Federalist Society, a conservative legal advocacy group, Thernstrom criticized 
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the Act, claiming that the renewal was done in a “clear political panic.”8  More 
surprising was the sharp discontent of such liberal election lawyers as New York 
University’s Richard Pildes.  About a year after Thernstrom’s essay, Pildes wrote:  
“Congress largely avoided facing the difficult policy issues…it ratified a 
regionally specific status quo that had been in place for the last twenty-five years, 
then locked that status quo into place for another twenty-five years to come…I 
have always thought that unanimous legislation is, paradoxically, the most 
problematic; it frequently signifies either that Congress is engaged in little more 
than credit-claiming, symbolic legislation, or when serious issues are at stake, 
that Congress has simply crafted a way to evade them.”9 
     One source of such misgivings was the recycling of the coverage formula that 
Congress created in 1975, that it retained in 1982, and that it retained yet again in 
2006.  The original 1965 coverage formula singled out jurisdictions that employed 
a “test or device” for voter registration, such as a literacy test, and that registered 
fewer than 50% of the voting age adults (as determined by the Director of the 
Census) or in which fewer than 50% of voting age adults voted in the November, 
1964 presidential elections.  At the 1970 renewal the benchmark election date was 
changed to the 1968 presidential election.  In 1975, the benchmark date became 
the 1972 presidential election.  After that, the coverage formula did not change, 
either in 1982 or in 2006.10  Small wonder that commentators such as Pildes could 
see this decision as avoiding the difficult task of updating the statute.   
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     Those who approved of the 2006 renewal argued, however, that the old 
coverage formula was still needed even though the covered jurisdictions seemed 
quite different.  The Voting Rights Act only looked obsolete.  In fact there was 
considerable evidence, they believed, that the Section 4 formula prevented 
backsliding.  Also, the Constitution is clear:  Congress enforces the 14th and 15th 
amendments “by appropriate legislation.”   
     The key term in doubt, of course, was “appropriate.”  But who decided 
appropriateness?   The answer seemed to be Congress.  Soon, however, the 
Supreme Court spoke up as well.   
 
The Invitation From the Court That Congress Declined 
     In a 2009 case from Texas, an unimportant political subdivision with an 
elected board, the Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One (or 
NAMUDNO), challenged the constitutionality of Section 5.  NAMUDNO was a 
covered district required to submit to preclearance.  It objected to the 
requirement, for it had no history of racial discrimination in its elections.  It 
simply happened to be covered under Section 4.  The anti-VRA lawyers who 
brought the case before the Court wanted a way to clearly demonstrate the Act’s 
obsolescence.11 
     Writing for the Court, and also attracting 7 other justices to the opinion, the 
Chief Justice established that Section 5 was an unusually powerful intrusion into 
the prerogatives of subnational governments.  That intrusion in fact had always 
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raised constitutional concerns among members of the Court.  Section 5 tampered 
with the “equal sovereignty” of the states and raised “federalism concerns.”  
Moreover, the coverage formula appeared out of date, and Congress had ignored 
warnings that it was out of date (and here Chief Justice Roberts cited the 
congressional testimony of Richard Pildes.)  However, the 15th Amendment 
“empowers ‘Congress,’ not the Court, to determine in the first instance what 
legislation is needed…”  The Court ought not to overstep itself.  Because it was 
possible to find a statutory basis for resolving the case – and thus avoid reaching 
the question of Section 5’s constitutionality – the Court was obliged to do that.  
To be sure, this meant re-casting and amending Section 4 so that NAMUDNO 
could avail itself of what is known as “bail-out.” That is, NAMUDNO could 
escape future Section 5 pre-clearance obligations by demonstrating that it had no 
record of invidious electoral administration.  Under the circumstances, it made 
sense for the Court to coalesce behind this “amend the meaning of Section 4” 
option – even though Associate Justice Clarence Thomas urged the Court (in his 
lone dissent) to reach the constitutional question.   
     This was a startling signal from the Court.  As the Yale law professor Heather 
Gerken wrote, “Yesterday the Supreme Court wrote a cliffhanger of an opinion 
on the constitutionality of Section of the Voting Rights Act…the Court raised 
serious questions about Section 5’s future, but it didn’t pull the trigger.  The 
question is how the story will end.”12  Eight out of 9 justices essentially agreed 
that it was quite possible that the statute was obsolete.  But because there was a 
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way for the Court to then avoid judging whether the 2006 renewal was in fact 
“appropriate legislation” the Court would take that less controversial path 
forward.   
     Informed observers took the ruling to be a plain suggestion to Congress that it 
ought to revisit the 2006 renewal, or at least to come up with amendments or 
legislative solutions that addressed the Court’s concerns.  After all, the 
Constitution gives Congress the power, not the Court, to enforce the Act.  It 
should do just that – especially when a decision is an 8-1 decision. 
     But Congress did nothing in response.  Why?  Those who dislike the 2006 
renewal hold that Congress could not revisit the Act because in reality there was 
no bipartisan consensus for fundamentally revising and updating it.  During the 
2006 renewal the lack of a substantive consensus on how best to modernize the 
Act was papered over.  The liberal civil rights groups and election lawyers who 
were satisfied with, indeed deeply invested in, the status quo essentially wrote 
the renewal for Congress -- and neither political party had a mind to challenge 
their handiwork.  At least the civil rights establishment offered a plan forward in 
2006 with the renewal, and everyone was happy to accept the plan.  Everyone 
preferred some renewal to the awkwardness of no renewal, so they held their 
noses and voted more or less unanimously for a poorly done job.   
     Such an analysis goes over well with those who think Congress is a bankrupt 
institution, deservedly despised by the American public.  But of course Congress 
is not a bankrupt institution.   One can easily think of two good explanations for 
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why Congress did not act.  The first is that the congressional consensus in favor 
of the renewal was not simply a feel- good hurrah for black voting rights but 
instead a considered decision.  The second is that Congress was extremely busy 
in 2009 with the Democratic party’s reform agenda, which included health care 
reform and financial regulatory reform, to say nothing of the required agenda of 
authorization and appropriations for existing federal programs.    
     In the end, Congress did not act.  But supporters of the Voting Rights Act 
remained quite nervous.  On its face, Section 4 relied on criteria for targeting 
jurisdictions that were, in 2009, 34 years old, and dated to the 1975 renewal.  In 
turn, these 1975 yardsticks captured political realities that existed in 1972.  Were 
the covered jurisdictions really frozen in political amber?  Four years later, as 
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the Court in Shelby proved, supporters of 
voting rights were right to be nervous about the glare of obsolescence that 
Section 4 appeared to give off. 
 
The Shelby Decision 
      Shelby County had sued the Attorney General in the Federal District Court in 
Washington, DC for objecting to election law changes that it had made, and it 
asked the District Court to declare that the coverage criteria of Section 4 and 
Section 5 were “facially unconstitutional.”  Writing again for the Court in a major 
voting rights case, Chief Justice Roberts briskly got down to suggesting that 
nothing less than a proper relationship between federalism and the enforcement 
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of voting rights was at stake.13  Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was “a drastic 
departure from the basic principles of federalism.”  Also Section 4 applied 
Section 5 to some states but not others, making it “an equally dramatic departure 
from the principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty.”  Thus two key sections 
of the Act conflicted with the normal practice of federalism.  When Congress first 
wrote the Act such exceptions were urgently needed.  Congress then renewed 
the statute in 1970, 1975, and 1982, and the Court supported “each of these 
reauthorizations.”  But then came the 2006 renewal – and NAMUDNO, that is, 
the case in which “we expressed serious doubts about the Act’s continued 
constitutionality.”  These doubts, expressed in 2009, were due to the “‘substantial 
federalism costs’” and to the prospect of continued differentiation among the 
states despite the cardinal principle of “equal sovereignty.”  “Eight members of 
the Court subscribed to these views…”  At that time the Court concluded that “‘a 
departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a 
showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to 
the problem that it targets.’”  That perspective governed, Roberts wrote, how the 
Court viewed the claim brought by Shelby County, Alabama. Roberts then 
proceeded to discuss the virtues of federalism – in particular how it “‘secures to 
citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power’” – and re-
emphasized, yet again, the equal sovereignty of the states and their customary 
control of election law.  He repeated, as well, that the Voting Rights Act was 
“‘extraordinary legislation otherwise unfamiliar to our federal system.’”   
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     Having emphasized federalism as essential to American democracy, Roberts 
then turned to the Act’s necessity.  It was in keeping with the needs of the time.  
“Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically.”  Voter turnout and 
black office holding in “covered jurisdictions” were robust, “in large part because 
of the Voting Rights Act.”  [emphasis in the original]  “The Act has proved 
immensely successful at redressing racial discrimination and integrating the 
voting process…Yet the Act has not eased the restrictions in § 5 or narrowed the 
scope of the coverage formula…along the way…These extraordinary and 
unprecedented features were reauthorized as if nothing had changed.”  Roberts 
proceeded to dissect and dismiss the federal government’s defense of the 
reauthorization.  “But a more fundamental problem remains:  Congress did not 
use the record it compiled to shape a coverage formula grounded in current 
conditions.  It instead reenacted a formula based on 40-year old facts having no 
logical relation to the present day.”  Roberts proceeded then to rebuke the 
dissenters from the majority opinion (led by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg), 
pointing out that two of them had joined the majority in the NAMUDNO 
decision, and to the decision’s expression of concerns about the Act.  He noted 
that “the dissent refuses to consider the principle of equal sovereignty, despite 
Northwest Austin’s emphasis on its significance.”  He reiterated that the Court, in 
2009, voiced “concerns about the constitutionality of the Act.  Congress could 
have updated the coverage formula at that time, but did not do so.  Its failure to 
act leaves us today with no choice but to declare §4(b) unconstitutional.  The 
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formula in that section can longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to 
preclearance.” 
     Justice Ginsburg opened her dissent by pointing out that the issue at stake 
was “who decides whether, as currently operative, §5 remains justifiable, this 
Court, or a Congress charged with the obligation to enforce the post-Civil War 
Amendments ‘by appropriate legislation.’”  Congress renewed the Act by large 
majorities, and its decision that the Act should be continued was “well within 
Congress’ province to make and should elicit this Court’s unstinting 
approbation.”  Ginsburg emphasized the care that Congress had taken in 
renewing the Act and also underscored the importance of deference to Congress 
– deference grounded in the enforcement clauses of the 14th and 15th 
Amendments.  Moreover, Congress found considerable evidence of continued 
resistance to minority voting rights in the covered jurisdictions.  Yes, times have 
changed.  But discrimination – and the potential for subtle forms of 
discrimination – had not truly disappeared in the covered jurisdictions – and 
Ginsburg proceeded to illustrate these claims in great detail.  Under the 
circumstances, “Hubris is a fit word for today’s demolition of the VRA.”  Indeed, 
the majority’s “unprecedented extension of the equal sovereignty principle 
outside its proper domain – the admission of new States – is capable of much 
mischief…In my judgment, the Court errs egregiously by overriding Congress’s 
decision.” 
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What To Make of Shelby? 
     Is the majority opinion in Shelby good or bad?  If one worries that government 
regulation can often go too far, then this was a good decision.  After all, the VRA 
created a regulatory system that seemed to keep growing and going.  On this 
view, the Court’s sensible reading of what seems obvious to everybody – that 
America is a different country than 1965, and that the clearest evidence is in the 
White House – then Shelby stops regulation that was no longer necessary.  And if 
one likes federalism – and surveys show that the public wholeheartedly likes 
federalism – then the majority’s emphasis on protecting federalism from 
irrational federal intrusions will seem not just useful but actually innovative.  If, 
on the other hand, one thinks that racial discrimination and the potential for its 
recrudescence are continuing and serious problems in American democracy, 
then one will think that Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion that was out of 
touch with what everybody knows about America:  that the first-class civic status 
of African-Americans is a hard-won achievement which requires continued 
protection. 
      The United States has in fact had two major reconstructions of African-
American voting rights.  The First Reconstruction, during the late 19th century, 
was a magnificent failure that ended in tragedy – that is, in a more or less total 
reversal of a democratic revolution.  The Second Reconstruction, which has been 
unfolding since the mid-1940s, is still largely a success.  But, plainly enough, the 
Second Reconstruction now faces considerable judicial opposition.   
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     The First Reconstruction of Southern electoral politics – particularly the 
decade between military reconstruction of the ex-Confederacy by a Republican-
controlled Congress (1867) and the immediate aftermath of the 1876 presidential 
election (early 1877) – saw the astonishing rise of biracial electoral and party 
politics in a region where African-Americans had been enslaved for over two 
centuries.  
     As is well known, this democratic revolution created a fierce backlash.  By the 
time of the 1876 presidential election, most of the biracial Southern governments, 
controlled by the Republican party, had been replaced by white Democratic 
party formations that were committed to weakening African-American and 
Republican influence on state-level public policy and on state and local 
institutions.  In the immediate aftermath of the 1876 election, the parties 
bargained over who would become President in March, 1877.  The upshot was 
the installation of the Republican candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes.   
     But Hayes’ predecessor, President Ulysses S. Grant, also allowed the 
remaining Republican governments in Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina to 
collapse.  The Louisiana and South Carolina governments were actually under 
military guard.  Their rivals were functioning simultaneously under paramilitary 
protection.  Federal troops were told to go home, and the Republican 
governments in Louisiana and South Carolina fled for safety.    
     Yet African-Americans continued to hold office and to vote at remarkably 
high rates.  The complete dissolution of the First Reconstruction thus occurred 
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much later than is commonly known -- toward the end of the 19th century and 
the beginning of the 20th century.  The year 1877 is typically taken as the end of 
bi-racial democracy in the South for nearly 100 years – but this is not true.  Bi-
racial democracy only died after a two-decade process of pushing African-
Americans out of electoral politics and office-holding had fully run its course.  
Black disenfranchisement began in 1889 in Florida and ended in 1907 in Georgia.   
     When the process of black disenfranchisement ended, something quite 
unusual in the history of Western democratic development had occurred.  First, a 
very large social group once entirely outside the political system had been 
rapidly and fully politically incorporated, namely, black adult males in the ex-
Confederacy. But then they had been pushed all the way back out of democratic 
politics, to the very margins of the polity in which they had been central actors 
for 35 years. 
     This rollback happened by quasi-democratic means.  The process was not 
associated with a large-scale regime change.  The Constitution of 1787 was still in 
force; American democracy was still in place.  A one-party, semi-authoritarian 
sub-national system had been built inside the overall democratic system.  There 
is no comparable example of such de-democratization in world history.14 
     The disestablishment of that subnational one-party system required a second 
reconstruction of Southern electoral and party politics – a struggle that began in 
earnest after World War II and that led to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and to 
the renewals and expansion of the Voting Rights Act in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 
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2006. But now the pace and force of that Second Reconstruction has changed. 
This hardly means that minority voting rights are actually deeply insecure.  But 
the Second Reconstruction of minority voting rights – an extended process that 
dates to the Court’s 1944 abolition of the Southern “white primary” – has taken a 
new turn that not too long ago was literally unthinkable. For those who lived 
through the civil rights movement, the idea that black voting rights now have a 
question mark over them at this late date is nothing less than an historical crime.  
At any rate, we must now hold our breath as we watch what may – or may not -- 
happen to minority voting rights.  The Obama Administration is forcefully using 
what remains of the Voting Rights Act to address voter ID legislation that it 
considers invalid under Section 2 of the Act.  Whether it succeeds is not obvious 
as of this writing.  Nor is it clear yet just how much trouble voter ID will actually 
cause to minority voters in the 2014 and 2016 elections.  Either way, there is a 
disturbingly Sysiphean quality to the struggle for black enfranchisement. 	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